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ABSTRACT

Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the
administrative state. By 1980, a majority of Justices seemed to be poised to hold that
large portions of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court stepped
back from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the
administrative state. The Court instructed lower courts to defer to any reasonable agency
interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute. The Court based this
doctrine of deference on the superior political accountability of agencies. Henceforth,
politically-unaccountable judges were prohibited from substituting their policy
preferences for those of politically-accountable agencies. The Court recognized that
agencies are politically accountable to the people because they are subject to the control
of the elected President.
The Court’s 1984 effort to democratize the administrative state has fallen far
short of its potential because of temporal problems with the manner in which the
Supreme Court defines and implements the deference doctrine the Court announced in
1984 and the other two doctrines that require courts to defer to agency interpretations of
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agency-administered texts. The most important of those deference doctrines is explicitly
premised on the Court’s understandable belief that policy decisions should be made by
the politically accountable President rather than by politically unaccountable judges.
Yet, the Court’s present method of implementing the deference doctrines has two
unfortunate effects. First, in a high proportion of cases, there is a lag of four to eight
years between the time that a President takes office and the time when a court is willing
to acquiesce in implementation of the policies preferred by the President. In other words,
each President is required to implement the policies preferred by his predecessor for at
least one term and perhaps even for two terms. Second, in some important situations,
regulatees are required to incur large costs in enforcement actions to comply with
interpretations of agency rules that have already been rejected by the incumbent
President by the time courts impose the costs on the regulatees and that were disavowed
by the agency at the time the regulatees engaged in the conduct that is the basis for the
enforcement actions.
Professor Pierce explains why he believes that these results are unacceptable,
and he proposes four changes in the Court’s present methods of implementing the
deference doctrines that will eliminate these effects and that will create a more
democratic and constitutionally legitimate administrative state in which Presidents
actually have the power to make changes in policy within the statutory boundaries set by
Congress.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the
administrative state.1 By 1980, it appeared that a majority of Supreme Court Justices
were prepared to outlaw large portions of the administrative state by holding that
Congress cannot delegate major policy decisions to “politically-unaccountable
bureaucrats.”2 In 1984, however, the Supreme Court unanimously stepped back from that
abyss and instead took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the
administrative state. In its opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Court recognized that Congress has the ultimate power to define the terms it uses in
1

E.g., John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 131-134 (1980); James Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The
Administrative Process and American Government 78-94 (1978); Thodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism:
The Second Republic of the United States 93 (1969); Peter Aronson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen Robinson, A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 63-67 (1982).
2
In his concurring opinion in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Occupational Safety and Health Act was unconstitutional because it was an
impermissible attempt by Congress to delegate a major policy decisions to “politically-unaccountable
bureaucrats.” 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980). The four-Justice plurality seemed to agree with Justice Rehnquist
when they concluded that the statute would be unconstitutional were it not for the plurality’s decision to
give it a saving construction. 448 U.S. at 646.
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statutory texts, but it went on to require a court to defer to any reasonable agency
interpretation of an ambiguous statute that Congress has instructed the agency to
implement.3 The Court made it clear that Chevron deference is based on constitutional
principles that are central to our democratic system of government – politically
accountable agencies, rather than politically unaccountable judges, should make the
policy decisions that are necessarily inherent in the process of giving meaning to
ambiguous texts that Congress has assigned agencies to implement.4
The Court anchored Chevron deference in the relationship between agencies and
the President. Thus, it explained:

[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of Government to make such policy choices –
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.5

The Court foreshadowed its 1984 recognition of the critical relationship between agency
policy decisions and the elected President in a 1983 opinion:

3

467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984).
467 U.S. at 865-866.
5
467 U.S. at 865-866.
4
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The agency’s changed view . . . seems to be related to the election of a new
President of a different political party. . . . A change in administration brought
about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in
light of the philosophy of the administration.6

The Court’s methods of applying the Chevron doctrine and the other doctrines
that require politically unaccountable judges to defer to politically accountable agencies
regularly yield results that are inconsistent with the Court’s attempt to infuse the
administrative state with principles of democracy, however. As applied by the Supreme
Court, the deference doctrines typically require a court to defer to the policy preferences
of a President who left office years ago rather than to the policy preferences of the person
who was elected to replace him. As a result of the Court’s decisions with respect to the
scope of the deference doctrines, a newly-elected President has little chance of
announcing any of his policies in a form that a Court is willing to accept as worthy of
deference during a single term in office, and a President is unlikely to be able to obtain
judicial acquiescence in all of his preferred policies even if he is re-elected for a second
term.
The cases I discuss to illustrate this phenomenon involve situations in which
courts require President Bush to implement policies adopted by former President Clinton

6

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Assn. V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Powell & O’Connor).
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rather than the policies preferred by President Bush. Some readers who dislike the policy
preferences of President Bush may consider this a socially-beneficial effect of the scope
of the doctrines I criticize. That is a short-sighted attitude, however. If the democrats
retake the Whitehouse in 2008, those same doctrines will require potential President
Hillary Clinton to implement many of the policies preferred by former President Bush for
all or most of her term of office.
Chevron deference is implicitly based on the assumption that an incumbent
President obtains control of the federal bureaucracy immediately upon taking the oath of
office. That is well known to be a counterfactual assumption, however. It typically takes
many months for a newly-elected President to get “his people” installed in all of the
agency policy making positions. It then takes those neophyte political appointees many
more months to figure out what the agency is doing and to begin to implement the
policies the President prefers.
When the incumbent’s preferred policies differ from those of his predecessor, the
process of changing policy is difficult and time-consuming. The President’s appointees
must identify and implement means of reversing the powerful inertial forces that have
developed in the permanent bureaucracy in support of the policies that were preferred by
the President’s predecessor in office. Even when the newly-elected President strongly
disagrees with a policy adopted by his predecessor, it may well take him a year or more
just to begin the process of switching to a policy that he, and presumptively a majority of
the electorate, prefer. Once the President’s appointees begin the process of attempting to
announce and to implement policies that are consistent with the President’s preferences,
they often confront procedural hurdles that typically take years to overcome before the
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President’s policy preferences can be announced in a manner that courts are willing to
accept.
My goal in this article is to explore some of the issues courts encounter when they
are required to review agency policy decisions during a period in which an agency is in
the process of changing from the policies preferred by a prior President to the policies
preferred by the incumbent. I then suggest ways of addressing those issues that are
consistent with the constitutional bases for the deference doctrines as well as with other
important principles of administrative law and constitutional law. I use two contemporary
disputes to illustrate the kinds of questions that arise when a court is required to resolve a
policy dispute during such a time of transition.
First, I discuss the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences.7
In that decision, the Court refused to defer to the interpretation of an ambiguous agencyadministered statute urged by the Solicitor General (SG) on behalf of the Bush
Administration and instead upheld the contrary interpretation previously adopted and
applied by the agency during the Clinton Administration. Second, I discuss some of the
many court opinions that have been handed down to date in the ongoing multi-billion
dollar dispute with respect to the meaning of the word “modification” contained in the
Clean Air Act. In resolving that dispute, a court must choose whether to defer to an
interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute adopted by the agency in a
rule issued in 2003 or to a 1999 agency interpretation of a pre-existing ambiguous agency
rule. The 2003 rule reflects the policy preferences of President Bush, while the inherently
inconsistent 1999 interpretation of the ambiguous pre-existing rule reflects the policy
preferences of President Clinton.
7

125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
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In part II, I discuss the deference doctrines that are important in resolving policy
disputes of this type, their bases, their scopes, and their corollaries. In part III, I describe
the policy dispute that the Supreme Court addressed in Dow and the opinions in which
the Court resolved that dispute. I then critique the Court’s opinions. I conclude that the
Court’s decision was entirely consistent with prevailing doctrine, but I am troubled by the
Court’s rejection of the policy preferred by the incumbent President and its approval
instead of the policy preferred by his predecessor even though the incumbent was elected
to replace his predecessor over four years prior to the Court’s decision.
In part IV, I describe the policy dispute that numerous lower courts have
addressed with respect to the meaning of “modification” in the Clean Air Act, as well as
the court opinions that address those disputes. I then critique the courts’ opinions. I
conclude that a court that resolves that dispute by applying prevailing doctrines, as the
Supreme Court presumably will do in the next few years, will also reject the policy
preferred by the incumbent in favor of the policy favored by his predecessor. I am
troubled by that result both because of the long time lag between the election of a
President and judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies and because it seems patently
unfair in the context in which the dispute is being addressed by courts. In the many
ongoing enforcement proceedings, EPA is urging courts to require electric utilities to
incur many billions of dollars of regulatory costs by adopting a statutory interpretation
EPA first urged in 1999 during the Clinton Administration, even though EPA urged the
utilities to engage in the conduct that allegedly triggered these massive regulatory
obligations by adopting announcing a contrary statutory interpretation in 1980 and EPA
formally rejected the 1999 Clinton Administration interpretation in favor of the pre-
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existing 1980 Carter Administration interpretation in 2003. It does not seem right to
impose many billions of dollars of regulatory costs on firms for engaging in conduct that
would not have been required under the interpretations in effect at the time the firms
engaged in the conduct or at the present time.
Finally, in part V, I propose changes in doctrine that would respond to the two
problems I identify. I propose one means of reducing the long lag time between the
election of a President and judicial acquiescence in the policies he prefers. At present, the
Supreme Court instructs lower courts to defer to a policy announced by an agency
through the process of giving meaning to an ambiguous statute only when the agency
announces the policy in a legislative rule or a decision issued in a formal adjudication. It
typically takes several years for an agency to take either of those highly formalized
actions. I urge the Supreme Court to adopt instead the proposal of Justice Scalia. He has
long argued that the Court should defer to a policy announced by an agency whenever it
represents the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the matter in question,” even if
the agency makes the announcement through use of a procedure less formal than a
legislative rule or a decision issued in a formal adjudication. Adoption of that approach
would reduce by several years the present intolerably long lag between the election of a
new President and judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies.
I propose three ways of avoiding the unfairness of subjecting firms to high costs
attributable to agency claims in enforcement proceedings that an ambiguous agency rule
means something dramatically different from the meaning the agency attributed to the
rule when the firms engaged in the conduct at issue in the enforcement proceedings and
the meaning the agency is now giving the rule. I attribute that result to the Supreme
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Court’s 1944 instruction to lower courts to give “controlling effect” to agency
interpretations of ambiguous agency rules. To avoid the potential unfair results this
doctrine of deference can create, I urge courts to adopt three practices that already have
considerable support in the case law. Courts should refuse to defer to agency
interpretations of ambiguous agency rules in three circumstances: (1) when the
interpretation is announced as a litigating position and there is reason to believe that it
does not represent the “fair and considered judgment of the agency on the matter in
question;” (2) when the agency is interpreting an open-ended rule that merely repeats the
vague language of the statute the rule purports to implement; and, (3) when the agency
interpretation of the rule would require a regulatee to incur large regulatory costs and the
interpretation urged in the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with the interpretation
in effect at the time the regulatee took the actions at issue in the enforcement
proceedings.

II. THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES

A. Chevron Deference

There are three deference doctrines that a court might be required to apply when it
reviews an agency policy decision that takes the form of an interpretation of an
ambiguous provision in an agency-administered text. The Chevron doctrine requires a
court to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agencyadministered statute if the agency has adopted the interpretation in a legislative rule or a
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formal adjudication.8 Chevron deference is based on constitutional principles – politically
unaccountable judges can not overrule policy decisions made by politically accountable
agencies.9

B. Skidmore Deference

If an agency announces an interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered
statute through use of a procedure less formal than a legislative rule or a formal
adjudication,10 the agency interpretation is due the weaker and more contingent type of
deference the Court announced in its 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.11 Under
Skidmore, the deference due an agency interpretation varies “with circumstances, and
courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”12 Skidmore
deference is based on an agency’s comparative advantage in terms of its subject matter
expertise, rather than on an agency’s comparative advantage with respect to its political
accountability.13

C. Seminole Rock Deference

8

Chevron deference also applies to some uncertain class of agency interpretations announced through use
of less formal procedures, but the Court has not explained how it will identify the other circumstances in
which Chevron deference is due an agency interpretation. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-231
(2001).
9
437 U.S. at 865-866.
10
533 U.S. at 229-231.
11
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
12
533 U.S. at 229-230; 323 U.S. at 139-140.
13
323 U.S. at 139-140; 533 U.S. at 229-231.
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Seminole Rock deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of one of its rules,
rather than to a statute the agency administers.14 Seminole Rock deference is about as
strong as Chevron deference.15 In Chevron, the Court instructed courts to uphold any
agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute as long as it is
reasonable, i.e., not arbitrary and capricious.16 In Seminole Rock, the Court instructed
reviewing courts to give an agency interpretation of an agency rule “controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”17 Those two deference
rules are stated in slightly different ways, but they are functionally indistinguishable.18
The Court did not describe the basis for Seminole Rock deference in its 1945 opinion, but
the Court has identified two bases for the doctrine in its subsequent opinions. Sometimes
the Court says that Seminole Rock deference is based on the same constitutional/political
accountability considerations as Chevron deference.19 In other cases, the Court says that
it is based on the same considerations of relative subject matter expertise as Skidmore.20

D. Differences Between the Deference Doctrines

The courts have announced corollaries to two of the deference doctrines that
logically follow from the quite different bases for each. Thus, for instance, Chevron
deference applies only to a statutory interpretation adopted by an agency that Congress
14

325 U.S. at 413-414. The Court applied Seminole Rock deference in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461
(1997). Since then, the Supreme Court, many lower courts, and many scholars have begun to refer to
Seminole Rock deference as Auer deference.,
15
John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, Colum. L. Rev. 612, 627-629 (1996)..
16
467 U.S. at 843-844.
17
325 U.S. at 413-414.
18
Manning, supra. note 15, at 627-629.
19
501 U.S. at 696-697.
20
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,151 (1991).
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has authorized to make policy decisions in the process of implementing a statute;21
Chevron deference does not apply when an agency adopts an interpretation of a statute
based on the agency’s interpretation of court opinions;22 and, Chevron deference applies
with as much strength to an agency decision to change its interpretation of an ambiguous
agency-administered statute as to an agency decision to adhere to a previously announced
interpretation.23 Each of those corollaries follows logically from the basis for Chevron
deference. An agency that does not have the power to make policy decisions is not
entitled to judicial deference when it exceeds its statutory authority by attempting to
make a legally binding policy decision, and an agency that adopts a statutory
interpretation based on its interpretation of judicial decisions is not entitled to deference
because its interpretation is not based on a policy decision.
The last of the three corollaries to the Chevron doctrine is particularly important.
By instructing courts to confer as much deference on changes in pre-existing agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes as on reaffirmations of long-standing
interpretations, the Supreme Court recognizes the need to allow any newly elected
President to change government policies within the boundaries set by Congress. It would
be inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of democratic government to force a
President to adhere to the policies of his predecessor when Congress has written a statute
that delegates policy making power to an agency in terms that permit a President to adopt
either his preferred policies or those of his predecessor. People vote in Presidential
elections because they prefer one candidate’s policy preferences to those of his opponent.
The courts should not be in the business of blocking implementation of the policies
21

499 U.S. at 151.
Akins v. FEC, 101 F. 3d 771 (D.C. Cir. en banc 1996).
23
517 U.S. at 742.
22
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presumptively preferred by the electorate except in the rare case in which those policy
preferences violate the Constitution.
By contrast, the Skidmore doctrine makes the extent of the deference due an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute depend to some
extent on the agency’s consistency in interpreting the statute over time.24 That approach
to deference makes sense when deference is based on an agency’s presumed comparative
advantage with respect to the specialized subject matter expertise required to apply a
statute to a complicated field of science. Inconsistency in an agency’s treatment of the
same scientific dispute naturally tends to reduce the credibility of the agency’s claim of
superior subject matter expertise. If the Food and Drug Administration, for instance,
expresses the same opinion with respect to some important scientific principle every two
years over a period of forty years, any judge is more likely to accept the agency’s opinion
on that issue than if the agency vacillates between two inconsistent opinions every other
year for forty years.
The Court has not said much about the role of consistency in deciding whether to
defer to an agency’s interpretation of an agency rule. The Court’s failure to address that
question in a definitive way fits with the Court’s multiple explanations for the Seminole
Rock doctrine. To the extent that Seminole Rock deference is based on an agency’s
presumed superior political accountability for policy decisions, the doctrine should apply
with equal strength to new interpretations that change pre-existing interpretations as to
interpretations that an agency has consistently held over a long period of time. By
contrast, a court should confer more deference on an agency’s consistent and
longstanding interpretation of a rule than on an agency’s recently announced change in its
24

323 U.S. at 139-140; 533 U.S. at 229-231.

15

interpretation of the rule if Seminole Rock deference is based on an agency’s presumed
superior expertise with respect to the subject matter of the rule.
In the next two parts of this article, I will describe the two policy disputes that I
have chosen to illustrate the kinds of problems courts confront when they are required to
review agency policy decisions at a time when agency policymaking is in transition from
one presidential administration to another and the opinions courts have issued to grapple
with those issues. I will then critique those opinions. In each case, I will begin with a
doctrinal critique of the opinions. I will ask the question whether the reasoning and result
in each case is based on an accurate application of prevailing doctrines. In that part of my
critique, I will assume that prevailing doctrines make sense in their substance, scope, and
corollaries. In the second part of my critique, I will discuss the question whether
prevailing doctrines should be changed in some way.

III. THE SCOPE OF EPA PREEMPTION OF STATE PESTICIDE REGULATION

A. The Policy Dispute

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate pesticides.25 FIFRA requires a
manufacturer to apply to register a pesticide with EPA. The statute instructs EPA to
approve an application to register a pesticide if, but only if, EPA determines that the
pesticide “will not cause unreasonable effects on humans and the environment.”26 The

25
26

7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. (2000).
7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(5)(C),(D).
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manufacturer must include its proposed product labeling with its application, and the
statute instructs EPA to approve the proposed labeling if, but only if, it complies with the
statutory prohibition on mislabeling.27
FIFRA also pre-empts some, but not all, state regulation of pesticides. Like most
preemption provisions in statutes that authorize a federal agency to regulate some subject
matter, the preemption provision in FIFRA is extremely difficult to interpret and apply,
particularly in the context of the forms of indirect state regulation that are accomplished
though use of tort suits based on state law. FIFRA authorizes a state to regulate a
federally-registered pesticide by prohibiting its use for some purpose that would
otherwise be permissible pursuant to its federal registration and/or by approving its use
for some purpose that otherwise would not be authorized by its federal registration as
long as the state-authorized use is not prohibited by the federal registration.28 In addition
FIFRA has another preemption provision that has produced a great deal of litigation:
“Such state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this statute.”29
EPA has taken several actions that relate to the scope and effect of the statutory
prohibition on state labeling requirements that are in addition to or different from the
EPA-approved labeling of a registered product. First, in 1978 EPA sought and obtained
from Congress a statutory amendment that empowered EPA to waive the pre-existing
statutory requirement that it register a pesticide only if it determined that the pesticide
was effective for its intended use.30 EPA convinced Congress that it lacked the resources

27

7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(5)(B).
7 U.S.C. §136v(a),(c).
29
7 U.S.C. §136v(b).
30
125 S.Ct. at 1796.
28
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required to determine whether a pesticide was effective or to evaluate the efficacy claims
a manufacturer made in its proposed labeling. In 1979, EPA exercised the waiver power
Congress granted it by issuing a rule in which it waived all regulation of pesticide
efficacy.31 In a 1996 public notice, EPA confirmed that it had “stopped evaluating
pesticide efficacy for routine label approvals almost two decades ago,” and that “EPA’s
approval of a pesticide label does not reflect any determination on the part of EPA that
the pesticide will be efficacious or will not damage crops or cause other property
damage.”32
In 2000, the Clinton-era EPA interpreted the FIFRA prohibition on state labeling
that is in addition to or different from EPA-approved labeling not to pre-empt state tort
suits that are based on alleged misbranding of a pesticide where the alleged misbranding
relates to efficacy, crop damage, or other property damage. EPA announced that
interpretation in the form of two amicus briefs EPA filed in state courts.33 In 2003 and
2004, the SG under President Bush announced that “the United States” had determined
that it had erred when it earlier interpreted FIFRA to be consistent with such state tort
actions.34 In two amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, the SG stated that “the
United States” now interprets FIFRA to prohibit such state tort suits. The SG explained
that the government’s change in its interpretation of FIFRA was based on its examination
of several judicial opinions in which courts had rejected EPA’s earlier interpretation.35

B. Supreme Court Opinions Addressing the Pesticide Regulation Pre-emption Issue
31

Id. at 1796.
Id. at 1796.
33
Id. at 1794.
34
Id. at 1801.
35
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences page 20.
32
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Scores of court opinions address the pesticide regulation pre-emption issue
described in part IIA.36 I will describe only the opinions issued in the case that reached
the Supreme Court in 2004. That dispute arose as a result of crop damage allegedly
caused by a pesticide named Strongarm made by Dow. Dow applied to register
Strongarm for application to peanut crops. Dow proposed labeling that included the
statement: “Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas in which peanuts are grown.”37
EPA granted the application for registration and approved the proposed labeling. When
peanut farmers in west Texas applied Strongarm to their crops, it stunted the growth of
the peanuts because of its interaction with soil with a ph in excess of 7.0.38 After the
farmers complained to Dow, it reregistered Strongarm with a new label that included the
statement: “Do not apply Strongarm to soils with a ph in excess of 7.2.”39 The peanut
farmers who had already suffered crop damage attributable to their use of Strongarm on
peanut crops grown in high ph soil then sued Dow in state court for, inter alia, failure to
warn and fraud.40 The farmers claimed that Dow knew that Strongarm would damage
peanut crops grown in high ph soil and affirmatively misled farmers by stating in its
labeling that Strongarm should be used in all soil conditions.41
Dow filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court in which it argued that
the farmers’ complaint under state tort law was pre-empted by FIFRA. The district court
granted summary judgment for Dow, and the Fifth Circuit upheld that decision.42 The
36

See cases discussed in id.
125 S.Ct. at 1793.
38
Id. at 1793.
39
Id. at 1793.
40
Id. at 1793.
41
Id. at 1793.
42
332 F. 3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003).
37
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circuit court reasoned that application of state tort law to the facts of the case would
violate the statutory prohibition on state required “labeling . . . in addition to or
different from” the labeling required by EPA because a jury verdict against Dow based
on fraud or failure to warn “would induce it to alter its product label.”43
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit court.44 The Supreme Court
held that a state tort verdict against Dow based on failure to warn or fraud is not preempted by FIFRA as long as state tort law imposes a duty to warn that is equivalent to the
FIFRA prohibition on mislabeling.45 FIFRA defines mislabeling to include false or
misleading statements or inadequate instructions, so the Court thought it was entirely
plausible that state tort law would impose labeling requirements equivalent to the
requirements imposed by FIFRA.
The Court rejected the interpretation urged upon it by the SG for several reasons.
First, it rejected the SG’s argument that the statute unambiguously pre-empts all tort
actions based on failure to warn.46 The Court concluded that “imposition of state
sanctions that merely duplicate federal requirements is equally consistent with the text .
. .”47 It characterized the government’s interpretation as “particularly dubious given that
just five years ago the United States advocated the interpretation that we adopt today.”48
Second, the Court noted that “for much of [the period in which FIFRA has been in effect]
EPA appears to have welcomed these suits”49 because they “would seem to aid, rather

43

Id. at 331.
125 S.Ct. 1788.
45
Id. at 1802-1803.
46
Id. at 1797-1799.
47
Id. at 1797.
48
Id. at 1801.
49
Id. at 1803.
44

20

than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.”50 Third, the Court rejected the government’s
argument that any labeling requirement imposed by state tort law necessarily would be
“in addition to or different from” the labeling EPA approved because EPA specifically
disavowed any role in approving labeling based on considerations of product efficacy or
risk of damage to crops – the subjects of the state tort complaint.51 Fourth, after
concluding that the statute was ambiguous, the Court applied the canon of construction
that requires a court to interpret ambiguous language in a statute in a manner that
disfavors pre-emption.52 Finally, the Court noted that: “State law requirements must be
measured against any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s misbranding
standards.”53
Three Justices wrote two separate opinions in Dow. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Breyer emphasized the final point the Court made in its opinion – that the preemptive effect of an agency-administered statute depends critically on the agency’s
interpretation of the statute:

[A]n administrative agency . . . ha[s] the legal authority within ordinary
administrative constraints to promulgate agency rules and to determine the preemptive effect of those rules in light of the agency’s special understanding of
“whether (or the extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal
objectives.”54

50

Id. at 1802.
Id. at 1802.
52
Id. at 1801.
53
Id. at 1803-1804.
54
Id. at 1804.
51
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Justices Thomas and Scalia stated their agreement with the Court’s opinion in most
respects but they expressed their disagreement on one important point:

[T]he majority states that the presumption against pre-emption requires choosing
the interpretation . . . that disfavors pre-emption. . . . That presumption does
not apply, however, when Congress has included within a statute an express preemption provision.55

C. Doctrinal Critique of the Dow Opinion

With one exception, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dow is doctrinally sound.
The Court began by concluding that the pre-emption provision of FIFRA that prohibits a
state from imposing a pesticide labeling requirement that is in addition to or different
from a labeling requirement imposed by EPA is ambiguous in its potential application to
a tort suit in which a party alleges that the pesticide manufacturer committed fraud or
failed to warn of a known adverse effect of a use of the pesticide in the form of the risk of
damage to crops caused by the pesticide.56 That conclusion was well-supported in the
Court’s opinion. The Court reasoned that if applicable state tort law imposes a duty to
warn that has the same meaning as FIFRA’s prohibition on mislabeling a pesticide, the
action of a state court in enforcing the duty to warn is not in addition to or different from
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the requirements imposed by FIFRA.57 In that entirely plausible situation, the Court
reasoned that: “The imposition of state sanctions for violating state rules that merely
duplicate federal requirements is equally consistent with the text of [that pre-emption
provision]”58 and that: “[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements
would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.”59
The Court refused to defer to the SG’s interpretation of FIFRA to pre-empt all
state tort actions that are based on an alleged failure to warn.60 The Court’s refusal to
confer Chevron deference on the SG’s interpretation was doctrinally sound on three
different bases. First, courts have consistently held that Chevron deference is due only a
statutory interpretation adopted by the agency Congress has charged with responsibility
to make the policy decisions required to implement a statute.61 Congress has given EPA,
not the SG, that policymaking power. Second, the Supreme Court has held that Chevron
deference is due only an agency interpretation announced in a legislative rule or an
opinion issued in a formal adjudication.62 The SG’s interpretation was announced only in
a brief, and Congress has never authorized any agency to make a legally binding decision
in the process of writing a brief. Third, courts have held that a court never owes Chevron
deference to an agency interpretation that is based on the agency’s analysis of judicial
decisions, rather than an agency policy decision,63 and the SG stated that his

57

Id. at 1798-1801.
Id. at 1797.
59
Id. at 1802.
60
Id. at 1801.
61
499 U.S. 144; Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §3.5 (4th ed. 2002).
62
533 U.S. at 229-231.
63
101 F. 3d 771.
58

23

interpretation was based on his analysis of prior court opinions that had rejected EPA’s
interpretation.64
The Court was also on firm doctrinal ground when it declined to confer Skidmore
deference on the SG’s interpretation. The SG’s interpretation fails to qualify for
deference by reference to all of the criteria the Court uses to decide whether to confer
Skidmore deference on an agency interpretation.65 The SG announced his interpretation in
an informal instrument. The SG has no comparative advantage vis a vis a court with
respect to the subject matter of FIFRA regulation. The SG’s interpretation was not a long
and consistently held interpretation, rather, it contradicted EPA’s long-held contrary
interpretation. Finally, the SG’s interpretation was not supported with persuasive
reasoning; instead of discussing the policy reasons in support of his interpretation, the SG
referred only to his agreement with an opinion of the California Supreme Court.
After the Court concluded that the FIFRA pre-emption provision is ambiguous
and after it refused to defer to the SG’s interpretation of that provision, the Court invoked
the canon of construction that requires a court to interpret pre-emption provisions
narrowly to support its interpretation of the pre-emption provision of FIFRA.66 That was
a doctrinal error. As Justices Scalia and Thomas pointed out in their separate opinion,67
the canon of construction the Court invoked applies only when a statute is silent or
ambiguous on the question of whether Congress intended to pre-empt state law. The
Court does not apply that canon when Congress explicitly preempts state actions and the
question before a court is the scope of that pre-emption provision. As Justice Breyer
64
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emphasized in his separate opinion,68 when Congress includes a pre-emption provision in
an agency-administered statute, and that provision is ambiguous with respect to its
potential application to some class of state actions, the Court defers to any reasonable
agency interpretation of the ambiguous pre-emption provision.69
That doctrinal flaw in the Court’s opinion in Dow is harmless, however, for two
reasons. First, it had no effect on the outcome of the proceeding, as the separate opinions
of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer recognize. Second, even though the Court based
its interpretation of the statute on an inapplicable canon rather than on deference to the
agency, the Court made it clear that it was greatly influenced by the agency’s
interpretation. The Court referred to EPA actions that influenced its decisionmaking in
three different passages. First, it referred to EPA’s 1996 Notice that it had not regulated
labeling claims related to crop damage in decades to refute the argument that a plaintiff’s
victory based on an alleged failure to warn about risks to crops would conflict with
EPA’s implementation of FIFRA.70 Second, the Court rejected the argument that
allowing the state tort action to proceed would frustrate the purposes of FIFRA by
referring to the fact that, until the SG decided to change the government’s position, “EPA
appears to have welcomed these tort suits.”71 Third, the Court ended its opinion with the
recognition that: “[s]tate law requirements must also be measured against any relevant
EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s misbranding standards.”72
I am confident that the Court would retreat quickly and unanimously from the one
instance in which its opinion in Dow is doctrinally flawed if it were presented with a case
68
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in which invocation of the narrowing canon conflicted with deference to a reasonable
agency interpretation of the FIFRA pre-emption provision. If, for instance, EPA were to
issue a rule in which it announced that it was resuming its pre-1979 practice of regulating
pesticide labeling with reference to the risks that pesticides pose to crops and that it
considered all pesticide labeling requirements imposed by states to be impermissible
impositions of requirements “in addition to or different” from the labeling requirements
EPA determined to be required by FIFRA, I am confident that the Court would uphold
that rule as a reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous pre-emption provision of
FIFRA.73

73

A hypothetical variation on the facts of Dow will suffice to illustrate my point. Imagine that Congress
increases EPA’s resources to implement FIFRA to the extent necessary for EPA to return to its pre-1979
practice of regulating the efficacy of pesticides and the risks that pesticides pose to crops. Imagine that
EPA then revokes the waiver it issued in 1979 and announces that, henceforth, it will investigate with care
the efficacy of each new pesticide that is the subject of a pesticide registration application and that it will
approve the labeling of any such pesticide if but only if it concludes that all claims of efficacy are accurate
and that any risks the pesticide poses to crops are disclosed in the labeling EPA approves for the pesticide.
Imagine that EPA then issues a rule in which it states that, as a result of the changes EPA has made in its
methods of implementing the FIFRA prohibition on misbranding, EPA has concluded that any labeling
requirement imposed by a state through any means, including a tort suit based on failure to warn or fraud, is
inherently “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s if the state attempts to impose that requirement on a
pesticide the labeling of which EPA approved after it announced the expansion in the scope of its
regulation of pesticide labeling. EPA explains further that its new comprehensive method of regulating
pesticide labeling will be most effective if it is exclusive and uniform, and that allowing state judges and
juries who lack any relevant expertise to second-guess EPA labeling decisions would create a chaotic
regulatory environment in which pesticide manufacturers would not know which of several potentiallyconflicting authorities to follow; pesticide manufacturers would incur unnecessary costs by having to
comply with as many as fifty-one different labeling regimes, and consumers would confront a bewildering
array of labels and warnings, many of which are based on some lay judge or juror’s mistaken beliefs about
the characteristics of a pesticide.
I have no doubt that the Supreme Court would ignore the Court’s erroneous reference to the
inapplicable canon of construction in Dow in this hypothetical situation. It would instead apply the
reasoning in the Thomas, Scalia, and Breyer opinions as the basis for a unanimous holding that FIFRA preempts any tort action against a pesticide manufacturer that is based on an alleged failure to warn users
about risks to crops if the suit is brought against the manufacturer of a pesticide the labeling of which was
approved by EPA after it began to regulate the contents of proposed labeling related to risks of crop
damage. Several passages in the Court’s opinion foreshadow this resolution of my hypothetical variation on
the facts of Dow. The Court notes that FIFRA “pre-empts competing state labeling standards,” id. at 1803;
that FIFRA pre-empts “any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a labeling requirement that
diverges from those set forth in FIFRA and its implementing regulations,” id. at 1803; and, that “[to the
extent that EPA promulgates such regulations in the future, they will necessarily affect the scope of preemption,” id. at 1804 n. 28. That opinion would be entirely consistent with, and required by, all of the
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D. Normative Critique of the Dow Opinion

In the preceding section, I criticized the Court’s opinion in Dow for relying on an
inapplicable canon of construction, rather than on deference to EPA, as the basis for its
holding that FIFRA does not preempt a state tort action that is based on an alleged failure
to warn of a known risk to crops posed by a pesticide. I went on, however, to conclude
that the opinion was doctrinally sound if the reasoning of the three concurring Justices is
substituted for the erroneous reasoning in that part of the Court’s opinion, with no
resulting change in outcome. In this section, I will broaden the bases for my critique to
include the question whether the doctrines that the Court properly applied are
normatively appropriate in their substance and scope.
I find little to criticize in the substance of the doctrines the Court applied in Dow.
Generally, the doctrines are well thought out and fit well in the context of a government
in which agencies make a high proportion of policy decisions under broad authority
delegated by Congress subject to supervision by the politically accountable President and
review by politically unaccountable courts. I am concerned about one of the effects of the
application of those doctrines in Dow, however. The Court rejects the policy preferred by
the incumbent President and upholds instead the policy preferred by his predecessor,
even though the incumbent replaced his predecessor over four years before the Court
decided the case. I am concerned that the doctrines we have adopted may not be

current administrative law doctrines. It would be analogous to the Court’s opinions in Geier v. Honda
American Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), and United States v. Locke, 592 U.S. 89 (2000).
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normatively appropriate if, and to the extent that, they frustrate the will of the electorate
by increasing substantially the time between the election of a President whose policy
preferences differ from those of his predecessor and the time when he is able to replace
his predecessor’s policies with those he prefers. I believe that we can improve the fit
between the deference doctrines and the performance of our democracy by changing the
scope of the deference doctrines.

E. Potential Changes in Doctrine

One potential change in doctrine would require a reviewing court to defer to the
SG’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute when
the SG adopts, announces, and urges on a court an interpretation that differs from the
agency’s interpretation. Justice Scalia suggested that courts should defer to
interpretations urged by the SG in amicus briefs in his concurring opinion in Christensen
v. Harris County.74 That change in doctrine would have had the effect of requiring the
court to uphold the incumbent President’s preferred policy rather than the policy
preferred by his predecessor in Dow.
Deferring to the SG, rather than the agency, has one appealing characteristic when
measured with reference to the political and constitutional values that provide the
underpinnings of Chevron deference. The SG typically is one of the members of an
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Dow, in which the SG makes no representation that EPA has adopted the interpretation the SG urges.
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Administration who is particularly close to the President. When the SG supports a policy
that differs from the policy adopted by an agency, the policy urged by the SG is far more
likely to reflect the President’s policy preferences than the policy adopted by the agency.
Moreover, even if the SG and the agency share a preference for the policy that is
preferred by the President, the agency cannot announce its preference in a form that
entitles it to Chevron deference for several years after the agency adopts that preference.
The Supreme Court has instructed reviewing courts to confer Chevron deference only on
agency interpretations announced in legislative rules or in decisions issued in formal
adjudications. It usually takes years for an agency to announce a new policy consistent
with the President’s policy preferences in a notice and comment rulemaking or a formal
adjudication.75 By contrast, the SG can announce a statutory interpretation that reflects
the President’s policy preferences in the briefs he files with courts shortly after the
President takes office.
On balance, however, I believe that it would be a mistake to adopt a doctrine of
deference to the SG. Such a doctrine would have many disadvantages. The Chevron
doctrine recognizes and gives effect to the power of the President in the overall context of
a constitutional democracy in which Congress has the ultimate power to make the vast
majority of policy decisions.76 In that context, Chevron deference makes sense. The
President is not the only politically-accountable institution, however. Congress is also
politically-accountable, and its preferences trump those of the President when Congress
75
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acts through use of the legislative process, as the Court recognized in step one of the twopart Chevron test.77 It would not be consistent with recognition of legislative supremacy
to extend Chevron deference to SG interpretations of agency-administered statutes.
Congress has never delegated to the SG the power to make the policy decisions necessary
to implement FIFRA.
Another potential change in doctrine would broaden the scope of Chevron
deference to include agency interpretations adopted and announced through use of
procedures less formal than a notice and comment rulemaking or a formal adjudication.
Since 2000, Justice Souter and Justice Scalia have engaged in a lively debate about the
appropriate scope of Chevron deference.78 Justice Souter has urged the Court to confer
Chevron deference only on agency interpretations announced in legislative rules, formal
adjudications, and some uncertain set of less formal procedures if Congress has indicated
an intent to authorize an agency to announce a legally binding interpretation through use
of that procedure.79 Justice Scalia has urged the Court to confer Chevron deference on
any agency interpretation announced through any means as long as it represents the
agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”80 So far, Justice
Souter has been successful in persuading a majority of the Court to adopt his views on the
appropriate scope of Chevron deference.81
My focus on the temporal effects of administrative law doctrines places the
Souter-Scalia debate in a new light. The narrow scope of Justice Souter’s approach to
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Chevron produces a situation in which a newly-elected President with policy preferences
that differ from those of his predecessor is unlikely to get most of his preferred policies
approved by courts and in effect in his first term in office. He probably will not be able to
get all of those policies approved even during his second term if he is fortunate enough to
be re-elected. By contrast, Justice Scalia’s broader approach to Chevron would allow a
President to get most of his preferred policies approved and in effect within a couple of
years of taking office. Since Chevron deference can yield judicial approval of a policy
only if the agency can convince a court that the policy it has announced is reasonable and
is within the boundaries Congress has established by statute, I believe that the Court
could further the political and constitutional goals of Chevron far more effectively if it
were to modify the Chevron doctrine by adopting Justice Scalia’s approach to its scope.82
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While I believe that the results of the Court’s opinion in Dow illustrate the desirability of a change in the
scope of Chevron, I do not believe that any defensible change in doctrine would change the outcome of the
particular dispute the Court resolved in Dow. As I argued in section IIIC, I believe that the Court would
have upheld an interpretation of FIFRA in which EPA announced both that it had resumed responsibility to
regulate pesticide efficacy, including the accuracy of proposed labeling as it relates to efficacy and risk of
crop damage, and that EPA’s approval of a proposed pesticide label preempts a state tort suit based on
alleged fraud or failure to warn. See supra. note 73 and accompanying text. I believe that EPA would have
no difficulty persuading the Court that such a change in policy is reasonable and within the statutory
boundaries on its discretion. That change of policy would require a large increase in the resources made
available to EPA for pesticide regulation, however.
The Bush Administration did not attempt to make that change in policy. Instead, the Bush
Administration attempted to change EPA’s policies by retaining EPA’s pre-existing refusal/inability to
regulate pesticide efficacy, including its inability to review the accuracy of proposed pesticide labels as
they relate to efficacy and risk of crop damage, while simultaneously announcing that all state regulation of
pesticide labeling related to efficacy and risk of crop damage is pre-empted. I do not believe that EPA
would be able to convince a court that such a peculiar combination of policies is either reasonable or
consistent with the statutory boundaries on its discretion.
When Congress prohibited a state from imposing a labeling requirement “in addition to or
different from” labeling required by FIFRA, Congress assumed that EPA would regulate each aspect of a
pesticide’s labeling, and Congress included the labeling pre-emption provision in FIFRA to obtain
uniformity in regulating pesticide labeling. I have no doubt that EPA could choose to regulate pesticide
labeling as it relates to efficacy and risk to crops and prohibit states from engaging in duplicative and
potentially conflicting regulation of that subject matter if Congress gave it the resources required to
perform that task. In that situation, pre-emption of all state regulation of labeling would further the
statutory goal of assuring uniformity in regulating labeling. I do not believe that EPA would be acting in a
manner consistent with FIFRA, however, if it continued to refuse to regulate an important aspect of
pesticide labeling and simultaneously asserted that states lack any power to regulate that area.When
Congress limited state regulatory power in FIFRA, by prohibiting states from imposing labeling
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IV. THE MEANING OF MODIFICATION IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT

A. The Policy Dispute

In 1970, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) that applied
expensive New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) to all major new stationary
sources of air pollution, including coal-fired generating plants.83 Old generating plants
were exempt from the new requirements, however. Congress believed that owners of old
plants should not be required to engage in expensive retrofitting of old plants that were
likely to be retired from service in the near future. Thus, the NSPS requirements applied
only to new plants or plants that had been modified. The statute defined a modification as
“any physical change in, or change in the operation of, a stationary source which
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source. . . .”84 In 1977,
Congress enacted another amendment to CAA that implemented a Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program that requires any owner of a major stationary
source constructed after 1977 to obtain a special permit and to comply with expensive

requirements “in addition to or inconsistent with” EPA labeling requirements, it was attempting to further
the goal of obtaining uniformity and consistency in pesticide regulation. Congress was not attempting to
create a legal regime in which no institution at any level of government can regulate labeling claims related
to the efficacy of a pesticide or to the risk that it will cause crop damage, thereby leaving farmers with no
source of legal protection from damage attributable to fraud or intentional mislabeling by pesticide
manufacturers.
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new air pollution control rules.85 The 1977 amendment defined construction to include
modification and followed its reference to modification with a parenthetical “(as defined
in [the pre-existing NSPS provision of CAA]).”86
Congress did not anticipate much controversy about the meaning of modification
in these two amendments. Congress assumed that most of the old, relatively highpolluting coal-fired generating plants would be retired within a few years after the
enactment of the amendments. That assumption proved to be mistaken. Most of the preexisting coal-fired plants are still in operation today, primarily because they are the
lowest cost source of electricity in the country. Indeed, those plants generate more
electricity today than when Congress amended CAA in the 1970s, and they account for
over half of the electricity consumed in the United States today.87 All of those plants have
been the subject of engineering projects that have rendered them quite different from the
plants that existed in the 1970s.88 The typical pre-existing coal-fired generating plant now
has greater capacity to generate electricity and lower emissions of pollutants per unit of
electricity generated. The question that has arisen repeatedly with respect to virtually all
of the old coal-fired plants is whether the major construction projects that allow the plants
to generate more electricity with lower per unit emissions constitute modifications within
the meaning of the PSD provisions of CAA. If they do, they were illegal when they were
implemented and the owners of the plants must now either retire each plant or retrofit
each with extraordinarily expensive new pollution control technology.
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EPA issued rules that define modification in 1971,89 1975,90 1978,91 1980,92
1992,93 and 2003.94 With three exceptions, however, none of those rules addressed the
most important recurring issue that arises in EPA’s dealings with owners of old coal-fired
generating plants. The statute defines a modification as a “change . . . which increases
the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.”95 What if the owner of a facility
implements a project that allows the facility to decrease the pollutants it emits per unit of
electricity generated but that also allows the facility to generate so much more electricity
that the aggregate quantity of some pollutant emitted by the facility increases even
though the per unit quantity of the pollutant emitted actually decreases substantially?
Does that qualify as an “increase” in emissions of a pollutant that causes implementation
of the project to become a “modification,” thereby triggering the expensive NSPS and
PSD requirements of CAA?
The 1971, 1978, and 1980 EPA rules that defined modification did not address
that issue. The 1975 rule addressed the issue by excluding from the definition of a
“change” that might otherwise qualify as a modification “[a]n increase in the hours of
operation or in the production rate.”96 The 1975 rule applied only to the definition of
modification in the NSPS provisions, however, and not to the definition in the PSD
provisions.97
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The 1992 rule applied to both NSPS and PSD. It excluded from the definition of
modification any increase in emissions that was caused by increased demand for the
output of a facility that was independent of any physical change to the facility.98 No court
ever resolved the dispute with respect to the legality of that rule, however, and the rule
did not apply to the scores of engineering and construction projects that facility owners
implemented before 1992. Facility owners challenged the validity of the 1992 rule, but
the D.C. Circuit stayed the review proceedings to allow EPA to complete a new
rulemaking that ultimately produced the 2003 rule.99
The 2003 rule also applies to both NSPS and PSD. It retains parts of the 1992
rule, but it has two changes which, in the aggregate, reduce significantly the number of
facilities and projects that qualify as modifications. It allows a facility owner to use its
emissions in any year within a ten-year lookback period to compare its past emissions
with its present or future emissions to determine whether its emissions have increased
rather than the two-year lookback period that previously applied.100 It also reaffirms the
exclusion for demand growth and expands that exclusion to cover other facilities in
addition to electric generating plants.101 The 2003 rule was upheld in a 2005 D.C. Circuit
opinion.102 By its terms, however, the 2003 rule does not apply to any activity that took
place prior to 2003.103 Indeed, it cannot apply retroactively because the Supreme Court
issued an opinion in 1988 that prohibits agencies from issuing rules with retroactive
effects.104
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Shortly after it issued its 1980 rule, EPA interpreted its definition of modification
for PSD purposes to allow a facility owner to implement a project that had the effect of
increasing its aggregate emissions of a pollutant only because of increased output from
the unit without obtaining a PSD permit or otherwise complying with the expensive PSD
requirements. EPA took the position that a project caused an increase in emissions only if
it had the effect of increasing the emissions per unit of output.105 EPA did not announce
that interpretation in a rule or a formal adjudication, however. EPA’s Director of the
Division of Stationary Source Enforcement announced the interpretation in the context of
decisions declining to take enforcement actions against facilities that implemented
projects that increased total emissions because of increased output but that reduced
emissions per unit of output.106 The 1980 interpretation of modification was an important
part of President Carter’s effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on expensive and
politically insecure sources of imported oil by increasing consumption of inexpensive
domestic coal supplies.107
In 1999 and 2000, however, EPA initiated a large number of highly publicized
enforcement actions against virtually all owners of coal-fired generating stations.108
Those actions were a major part of President Clinton’s effort to reduce air pollution. In
each action, EPA alleged that the facility owner had acted illegally during the 1980 to
1999 period in implementing projects that had the effect of increasing aggregate
emissions of one or more pollutant from each facility. In each case, the project had not
105
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increased emissions per unit of output; emissions had increased solely because the facility
was being used to produce more electricity. EPA alleged that the projects constituted
modifications within the meaning of that term as it is used in the 1980 PSD rules because
the projects enabled the owner to increase the rate of utilization of the facility, thereby
increasing aggregate emissions from the facility. In each case, the facility owner
defended its past conduct by arguing that a project implemented with respect to an old
coal-fired generating plant qualified as a modification for PSD purposes only if the
project produced an increase in emissions of pollutants per unit of output, which was not
the case with respect to any of the scores of old plants that had undergone major projects
between 1980 and 1999.

B. Court Opinions Addressing the Dispute About the Meaning of Modification

Between 2003 and 2005, five courts issued opinions in which they reviewed EPA
interpretations of modification, as that term is used in the context of the CAA PSD
provisions. In opinions issued in 2003, two district courts decided that Congress had
unambiguously resolved the question of the meaning of modification and, thus, that EPA
had no discretion with respect to the meaning of the term and a court owed no deference
to any EPA interpretation of the term. Those courts resolved the issue of law in
inconsistent ways, however.109 The District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina held that EPA was required to define modification to exclude a project that
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increased emissions only because it enabled the facility to increase its output,110 while the
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that EPA was required to define
modification to include such a project.111 By contrast, all three of the court opinions
issued in 2005 concluded that the statutory term modification is ambiguous. Those
opinions were issued by the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,112 the
Fourth Circuit,113 and the D.C. Circuit.114
In United States v. Alabama Power Co., the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama was required to determine the meaning of modification in the context
of an enforcement proceeding in which EPA was urging the court to hold that a firm
violated the PSD provisions of CAA by implementing projects during the period 19801999 that increased aggregate emissions from facilities only because the firm increased
its rate of output from the facilities.115 EPA could prevail only if the court accepted
EPA’s 1999 interpretation of modification, rather than its 1980 or 2003 interpretation.
The court first concluded that the term modification is ambiguous.116 The court then
stated that: “[a]s an abstract principle, the court agrees with EPA . . . that deference is
due the EPA in the agency’s interpretation of the CAA’s . . . increased emissions
provisions.”117
The court then turned to the question of which of the inconsistent EPA
interpretations were entitled to deference. It refused to defer to the interpretation
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announced in EPA’s 2003 rule.118 The court noted that the 2003 rule, by its terms, applies
only to conduct that took place after the rule was issued, while all of the conduct at issue
in the case before the court took place well before 2003.119 The court also refused to defer
to the 1999 interpretation EPA urged in its brief.120 The court reasoned that an
interpretation announced in a brief is not entitled to Chevron deference but only to the
weaker and more contingent form of deference described in Skidmore.121 The court
concluded that it should not confer Skidmore deference on that agency interpretation
because it was inconsistent with both the informal interpretation EPA announced in
declining to take enforcement actions in 1980 and the formal interpretation EPA
announced in its 2003 rule.122 The court was particularly troubled by EPA’s argument
that a court should defer in 2005 to an interpretation that was inconsistent with the
agency’s prior interpretation and that the agency had formally rejected in the rule it
issued in 2003. In the court’s words:

Finally, if one compares the 2003 Rule . . . . with this civil action, what one sees
is one office of EPA attempting to expand and clarify the . . . provisions [that
exempt facilities from PSD] through rulemaking, while another is attempting to
redefine them through enforcement actions and litigation.123
*

*

*
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This leaves the anomaly of utilities, like APC, being prosecuted for conduct that,
if engaged in now, would not be prosecuted. Put another way, this action is a
sport, which is not exactly what one would expect to find in a national regulatory
enforcement program.124

After concluding that EPA had not issued any interpretation of modification to which the
court should defer, the district court adopted its own preferred interpretation of
modification:

Emissions increases, for purposes of NSR/PSD analysis, are calculated only on
the basis of “maximum hourly emission rates”, not “annual actual emissions”.
Maximum hourly emissions must increase before PSD permitting is triggered;
greater facility utilization is irrelevant to the analysis.125

The Fourth Circuit addressed the same issues in a virtually identical context in its
2005 opinion in United States v. Duke Energy Corp.126 The court held that modification
was ambiguous with respect to the meaning of an increase in emissions.127 Thus, the
court emphasized that EPA has the power to adopt by rule either of the competing
definitions of modification.128 The court also concluded, however, that Congress did not
give EPA discretion to interpret modification to have different meanings in the contexts
124

Id. at 1306 n. 44.
Id. at 1306-1307.
126
411 F. 3d 539.
127
The court did not actually state that the term is ambiguous, but it stated that “EPA retains the power to
amend this and other regulations ‘through exercise of appropriate rulemaking powers.’” Id. at 550. EPA
could not make such a change in interpretation by rule unless the statutory term it is interpreting is
ambiguous.
128
Id. at 550.
125

40

of the NSPS and PSD programs.129 The court recognized that Congress can, and
sometimes does, permit an agency to define the same statutory term in different ways
when the term is used for different purposes, and the court recognized that there are “vital
differences” between the PSD and NSPS programs.130 Still, the court concluded that the
language Congress used in the 1977 amendment unambiguously required EPA to define
modification the same way for both purposes.131 To the Fourth Circuit, the critical
sentence in the definition section of the 1977 PSD amendments was: “The term
‘construction’ when used in connection with any source or modification includes the
modification (as defined in [the analogous section of the NSPS provisions]) of any source
or facility.”132 Since all parties, including EPA, agreed that EPA had issued a rule in 1975
that excluded increases in emissions attributable to increased output from the definition
of modification in NSPS, the court concluded that EPA was required to use the same
definition for purposes of PSD unless and until EPA issues a rule that changes the
definition of modification for both purposes.133
The third 2005 opinion that discussed the interpretation of modification was the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in New York v. EPA.134 The issue arose in a different context in
that case, however. The court reviewed the validity of the rule EPA issued in 2003. That
rule interpreted modification to exclude most projects that increase emissions by enabling
a facility to increase its output by allowing a facility owner to choose any year in a ten
year lookback period to use as the baseline from which to determine whether an increase
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in emissions has occurred and by excluding any increase in emissions that is attributable
only to growth in the demand for the output of the facility.135 The court first held that the
statutory definition of modification was ambiguous and then upheld EPA’s new
interpretation of that term as reasonable.136 Since the interpretation was announced in a
legislative rule, the court applied Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation.137
The court noted that EPA “is entitled to balance environmental concerns with
economic and administrative concerns.”138 That is clearly what EPA did when it issued
its 2003 rule. Of course, EPA engaged in the same balancing process when it adopted the
quite different interpretation of modification for the purpose of taking the plethora of
enforcement actions it initiated in 1999 and 2000. The difference in the outcomes of the
two balancing processes should come as no surprise to anyone who follows politics. The
1999-2000 EPA interpretation was reflective of the policies of President Clinton, while
the 2003 interpretation was reflective of the policies of President Bush. Indeed, in 2005
EPA proposed a new definition of modification that would give facility owners even
greater discretion to make large changes to their old facilities without having to obtain a
PSD permit or to install the extraordinarily expensive pollution control equipment
required to comply with the PSD rules.139

C. Doctrinal Critique of the Opinions Interpreting Modification

135

Id. at 10.
Id. at 20-27.
137
Id. at 17-18.
138
Id. at 23.
139
70 Fed. Reg. 61,081 (Oct. 20, 2005). See New Rules Could Allow Power Plants to Pollute More, The
Washington Post, p. A1 (August 31, 2005); EPA Issues Draft Rules on Plants’ Emissions, The Washington
Post, p. A4 (October 14, 2005).
136

42

It is particularly important to determine whether the five recent court opinions that
review EPA’s interpretations of modification are doctrinally sound. The Supreme Court
is likely to resolve this dispute eventually, and the Court is likely to resolve it through
application of prevailing doctrines. Thus, a hypothetical doctrinally-sound resolution of
the issue is likely to replace the doctrinally-flawed and inconsistent lower court opinions
that have been issued through 2005.
The two courts that issued opinions in which they reviewed EPA’s interpretation
of modification in 2003 held that Congress unambiguously resolved the question of how
to determine whether a major construction project implemented at a facility increases its
emissions of a pollutant and, hence, constitutes a modification for PSD purposes.140 The
reasoning in each of those opinions detracts from the plausibility of the conclusion in the
other, however, since each court concluded that Congress clearly resolved the issue in a
manner diametrically opposed to the other court’s conclusion.141 The three courts that
issued opinions on this issue in 2005 concluded that the statutory definition of
modification is ambiguous in its potential application to a facility that has increased its
total emissions solely because it has increased its output even though the changes made to
the facility decreased its rate of emissions per unit of output.142
The courts that concluded that the statutory term is ambiguous have the better of
this argument. The CAA defines modification with reference to a project that has the
effect of increasing emissions of any pollutant, but it leaves the term “increase”
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undefined.143 In that situation, increase can refer either to an increase in aggregate
emissions due solely to an increase in output or to an increase in the rate of emissions per
unit of output. As the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit concluded, giving meaning to
the term increase in the context of the PSD provisions of CAA requires some institution
to make a policy decision in which it must balance the two conflicting goals of the Clean
Air Act – reducing air pollution and enhancing or preserving economic prosperity.144
When EPA interprets modification in a manner that permits a facility owner to
implement a project that simultaneously reduces emissions per unit and increases output
from the facility without having to comply with the expensive PSD rules, it is arguably
furthering the policy goals of the CAA by refraining from inadvertently discouraging
utilities from implementing socially-beneficial projects that allow utilities to continue to
generate electricity in the lowest cost facilities available today with a resulting decrease
in emissions of pollutants per unit of electricity generated. When EPA interprets
modification in a manner that has the effect of applying the PSD rules to almost any
project implemented at an old, high-polluting plant, it is arguably furthering the policy
goals of CAA by encouraging the owners of the highest polluting sources of electricity in
the country to replace those old facilities with modern, low-polluting facilities. The two
district courts that adopted their own interpretations of modification ignored the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Chevron that politically unaccountable judges should not substitute
their own policy preferences for those of a politically accountable agency.145 The three
courts that concluded that modification is ambiguous acted in a manner that was true to
the Chevron doctrine.
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The D.C. Circuit concluded that the statutory term modification is ambiguous and
then upheld as reasonable EPA’s interpretation of that rule announced in its 2003 rule.146
Since the rule is legislative, the D.C. Circuit properly invoked Chevron deference in the
process of upholding EPA’s interpretation.147
Even though it concluded that modification is ambiguous, the Fourth Circuit also
concluded that Congress had unambiguously required EPA to define modification in the
same manner for purposes of both the NSPS program and the PSD program.148 That
conclusion had the effect of requiring EPA to define modification to exclude a change in
a facility that increases emissions only by enabling the facility to increase its output for
PSD purposes because EPA had issued a legislative rule in 1975 that defined
modification in that manner in the context of the NSPS program.149 If the Fourth Circuit
is right with respect to its conclusion that Congress required EPA to give modification the
same meaning for both purposes, the rest of the court’s conclusions follow logically
through application of well-established administrative law doctrines. A court owes
deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute
when the agency announces that interpretation in a legislative rule, and an agency can
only amend a legislative rule by issuing another legislative rule.150 I believe that the
Fourth Circuit was wrong to conclude that EPA lacks the discretion to adopt different
interpretations of modification for NSPS and PSD purposes, however.151 In any event, the
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Fourth Circuit recognized that EPA could change its 1975 interpretation of modification
for purposes of both the PSD program and the NSPS program, but it could only do so by
using the cumbersome and time-consuming legislative rulemaking process to amend its
pre-existing legislative rule that defined modification for purposes of the NSPS
program.152
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama concluded that
modification is ambiguous and stated that “in the abstract,” it was required to defer to any
reasonable EPA interpretation of modification.153 The court then refused to defer to the
interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 rule because, even though EPA announced that
interpretation in a form that renders it subject to Chevron deference, the rule has
seven-Justice majority in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), requires me to reconsider my views,
however. The Supreme Court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is required to give the
same statutory phrase the same meaning in two quite different contexts. The majority reasoned that its
holding was required to avoid establishing “the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory
text different meanings in different cases.”Id. at ___.
I am not sure what to make of the Court’s opinion in Clark. It is potentially distinguishable from
the cases reviewing EPA’s different definitions of modification on two bases – INS never announced an
interpretation of the statutory text at issue in Clark in a form that was even arguably entitled to Chevron
deference, and the term modification in CAA is not “the same statutory text;” rather, it is the same word
used in different parts of the same statute. Moreover, as my colleague Jonathan Siegel has shown, the
Supreme Court has frequently embraced the principle the Clark majority rejected as dangerous. Jonathan
Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339,
343-365. In fact, as recently as 2004, the Supreme Court characterized as a “presumption” the canon of
construction that the same term has the same meaning in every context when it is used in the same statute.
General Dynamics Land System v. Kline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004). The Court went on to explain that the
“presumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the
terms are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act
with different intent.” Id. at 595.
Siegel has also argued that courts should continue that practice in the many circumstances in
which a court can further the goals of a statute most effectively by adopting different interpretations of the
same ambiguous statutory language in different contexts. Siegel, supra., at 365-385. I find Siegel’s
arguments persuasive. They apply with particular force to a situation in which a politically-accountable
agency gives different meanings to the same word when that word is used in two quite different contexts in
the same statute. In that context, the court should simply cite Chevron and defer to any reasonable agency
interpretation of the ambiguous word. The Fourth Circuit now seems to agree with me on that point. In an
opinion issued after the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in Duke and after the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Martinez, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Bureau of Prisons decision in which the agency gave the
same term different meanings in different contexts even though the term was used in the same sentence of
the same statute. Yi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F. 3d 526 (4th Cir. 2005).
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prospective effect only, and all of the conduct at issue before the court took place prior to
2003.154 The court also refused to defer to the contrary interpretation EPA urged in its
brief submitted in the case before the court because that interpretation was announced in
a form that entitled it only to the weaker and contingent form of deference the Court
described in Skidmore.155 The court concluded that the interpretation EPA urged in its
brief was not entitled to Skidmore deference because it was inconsistent both with EPA’s
prior interpretation announced by a senior enforcement official in 1980 and with EPA’s
present interpretation reflected in EPA’s 2003 rule.156 Lacking any agency interpretation
to which it was willing to defer, the court announced and applied its own preferred
interpretation – a facility has been modified for PSD purposes only if it has been changed
in a way that increases its emissions per unit of output.157
The District Court applied prevailing doctrine when it declined to defer
retroactively to the interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 rule, but it departed from
applicable doctrine when it held that the interpretation EPA urged in its brief was entitled
only to Skidmore deference. The interpretation EPA adopted and announced in the
context of bringing the enforcement actions it initiated in 1999-2000 was not just an
interpretation of ambiguous language in an agency-administered statute, it was also an
interpretation of the ambiguous language in the legislative rule EPA issued in 1980. As
such, it was entitled to Seminole Rock deference. That form of deference is stronger than
Skidmore deference and, unlike Skidmore deference, it is not contingent on consistency in
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the agency’s interpretation of the rule.158 Moreover, unlike Chevron deference, Seminole
Rock deference necessarily applies to agency interpretations announced through use of
procedures less formal than notice and comment rulemaking or a decision issued in a
formal adjudication.159 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a court must confer
Seminole Rock deference on at least some agency interpretations of ambiguous agency
rules that are announced only as litigating positions in briefs.160
Seminole Rock requires a court to give an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
rule “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”161 The District Court did not conclude, and could not have concluded, that
the agency’s 1999 interpretation of its ambiguous 1980 rule was either “plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation,” so the court should have deferred to that
interpretation. There are three bases on which the court might have attempted to defend
its decision not to defer to EPA’s interpretation of its 1980 rule, but the court did not
mention any of the three.162 I will discuss those potential bases for escaping from the duty
to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a rule in section IVE.
The District Court also departed from precedent when it gave the ambiguous term
modification the court’s own preferred meaning. A court has no choice but to adopt its
own preferred construction of an ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute
when the agency has not announced an interpretation to which the court can defer.163
That was not the situation the district court confronted, however. It was required to defer
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to EPA’s interpretation of its 1980 rule, and since that rule is a legislative rule, EPA’s
interpretation of that rule also resolves the ambiguity in the statutory definition of
modification.

D. Normative Critique of the Opinions on the Meaning of Modification

In section IVC, I concluded that the three 2005 opinions that reviewed EPA
interpretations of the term modification, as that term is used in the PSD provisions of
CAA, accurately applied prevailing doctrines when they concluded that the term is
ambiguous, that the D.C. Circuit acted in a manner consistent with prevailing doctrine
when it upheld the interpretation of modification EPA announced in its 2003 rule, and
that the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama accurately applied prevailing
doctrine when it declined to apply the statutory interpretation EPA announced in its 2003
rule retroactively. I also concluded that the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama acted in a manner inconsistent with prevailing doctrine when it refused to defer
to EPA’s interpretation of its 1980 rule defining modification and when it adopted its
own preferred interpretation of the statutory term modification. Finally, I concluded that
the Fourth Circuit was wrong when it concluded that EPA must give modification the
same meaning in the context of both the NSPS program and the PSD program.
If my doctrinal critique is correct, any court that applies prevailing doctrines
accurately to the scores of pending EPA CAA enforcement actions will have no choice
but to defer to EPA’s 1999 interpretation of modification that it is continuing to urge
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courts to apply in its ongoing enforcement proceedings in 2006. I am troubled by that
result for two reasons, however. First, like the results of applying prevailing doctrines in
Dow,164 it has the effect of requiring a court in 2006 to reject the policy preferred by the
incumbent President in favor of the contrary policy of his predecessor, even though the
incumbent took office five years earlier in 2001. Second, I share the concerns about
fairness and regularity expressed by the District Judge in the Alabama Power case.165 It
does not seem right to conclude that a firm violated the law during the period between
1980 and 1999, and to require the firm to incur hundreds of millions of dollars of
mandated costs, based on an interpretation of an ambiguous rule and statute that the
government did not announce until 1999, when the firm acted on the basis of the
agency’s contrary interpretation announced in 1980 and when a court would have to
conclude that the firm acted in an entirely lawful manner if its conduct were to be judged
with reference to the definitive interpretation of the statute the agency announced in
2003.

E. Potential Changes in Doctrine

My concerns about the unfortunate results of the application of prevailing
doctrines to the dispute with respect to the meaning of modification motivates me to
consider critically whether today’s prevailing doctrines make sense or whether we should
change one or more of those doctrines.
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There are several changes in doctrine that could avoid the two adverse effects of
applying prevailing doctrine in these problematic enforcement cases. The Supreme Court
could overrule Seminole Rock and substitute a less powerful and more contingent form of
deference for Seminole Rock deference. Such a change in doctrine would allow a court to
refuse to defer to EPA’s 1999 interpretation of its 1980 rule. That, in turn, would allow a
court to adopt an interpretation of modification that is consistent with the policy
preferences of the incumbent President and that would avoid penalizing firms for
engaging in conduct that they had no reason to believe was unlawful at the time the firms
engaged in the conduct.
John Manning wrote an excellent article in 1996 in which he urged just such a
change in doctrine.166 Manning argued that courts should not confer a strong form of
deference on agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules because such a doctrine
of deference encourages agencies to issue ambiguous rules.167 Manning makes some
good points, but I do not support his proposed change in doctrine for two reasons. First,
as Manning acknowledges, adoption of his proposal would have costs of three types: it
would increase the power of politically unaccountable judges to substitute their own
preferred policies for those of politically accountable agencies; it would discourage
agencies from issuing rules; and, it would delay final resolution of many policy
disputes.168 I believe those costs exceed the benefits of the doctrinal change Manning
urges. Second, while adoption of Manning’s proposal would have a salutary effect in the
context of the pending CAA enforcement disputes, it would have the opposite effect in
most cases. One of the few ways in which an agency can change its policies to reflect
166
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those of the incumbent President expeditiously is to adopt an interpretation of an
ambiguous agency rule. Seminole Rock then requires a court to defer to the agency
interpretation. Thus, by overruling Seminole Rock, the Court would be exacerbating the
problem of delay between the time a President is elected and the time when the courts
will allow his policy preferences to replace those of his predecessor.
There are three more modest changes in existing doctrines that offer some
potential to avoid the adverse effects of applying existing doctrines in the CAA
enforcement cases, however. Each has some support in judicial decisions.
First, courts, including the Supreme Court, have begun to refuse to defer to
agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules where the rules were written in an
extraordinarily open-ended manner.169 The Tenth Circuit explained the basis for this
judicial tendency in a 1998 opinion.170 In that case, the agency had issued a rule that did
little more than parrot the open-ended language of the statute the rule was supposed to
implement. The agency then attempted to rely entirely on informal interpretations of its
open-ended rule to announce all of its interpretations of the statute the rule was supposed
to implement. The court noted that Congress authorizes agencies to issue rules to
implement statutes primarily to provide a means through which an agency can
particularize the often vague and open-ended commands contained in regulatory
statutes.171 The court refused to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its rule because, by
doing so, the court would encourage agencies to substitute regulatory ambiguity for
169
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statutory ambiguity, thereby making a “mockery of . . . the [Administrative Procedure
Act].”172 The D.C. Circuit has provided a more colorful explanation for this limit on
Seminole Rock deference: “An agency cannot create mush and then give it form only
through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”173 A six-Justice majority of the
Supreme Court explicitly adopted the antiparroting exception to Seminole Rock deference
in its 2006 opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon.174
Application of the reasoning in Gonzales to the CAA enforcement cases would
avoid the results that concern me. It would provide a potential basis for a court to refuse
to defer to the 1999 interpretation of modification, thereby allowing the court to adopt
instead the 2003 interpretation as its own. The Gonzales majority requires a rule to clarify
in some meaningful way the interpretive dispute that the agency addresses in order to
avoid judicial characterization of the rule as a mere parroting rule that is not entitled to
Seminole Rock deference.175 The 1980 EPA rule fails that test and should be
characterized as a mere parroting rule. More broadly, general application of the
antiparroting exception to Seminole Rock deference would have the beneficial effects of
adoption of Manning’s proposal without incurring the high costs attendant to adoption of
the Manning proposal. The disadvantage of this approach lies in the difficulty of drawing
the line between a rule that an agency is free to interpret because it is merely ambiguous
and a rule that adds so little to a vague provision of a statute that a court should not
confer deference on an agency interpretation of the rule. The Supreme Court divided five-
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to-four in resolving two such line-drawing disputes in the 1990s,176 and six-to-three in
resolving the line-drawing dispute in Gonzales.177 As difficult as it may be to draw that
line in some cases, however, I believe it is a line worth drawing. A good argument can be
made that the 1980 rule EPA interpreted in bringing its enforcement proceedings in 1999
added so little to the vague statutory definition of modification that courts should not
defer to agency interpretations of that rule.
A second promising approach is for a court to refuse to defer to an agency
interpretation of a rule when that interpretation is announced only as a litigating position
and when there is reason to believe that the interpretation is not the “agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the issue.”178 The D.C. Circuit explained the basis for its
reluctance to defer to agency interpretations of rules announced only as litigating
positions in a 1997 opinion:

This reluctance to defer to agency counsel stems from two concerns. First, . . .
counsel’s interpretation may not reflect the views of the agency itself . . . .
Second, it is likely that a position established only in litigation may have been
developed hastily, or under special pressure, and is not the result of the agency’s
deliberative processes. However, as the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed,
deference to an interpretation offered in the course of litigation is still proper as
long as it reflects the “agency’s fair and considered judgment.”179
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The D.C. Circuit’s approach makes a lot of sense. Agency supervision of agency lawyers
is highly uneven. Sometimes the positions a lawyer proposes to take in litigation have
been discussed and approved at the highest levels of the agency. In other cases, however,
no policymaking official has even considered, much less approved, the position the
lawyer is taking in litigation.
If a court were to apply this approach to the interpretation of the 1980 rule that
EPA is urging in the pending enforcement cases, it would have little difficulty concluding
that the interpretation is not the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the issue.”
After all, the policymaking officials in the agency have announced policies in 2003 and
2005 that are the opposite of the positions the agency’s lawyers have taken in the
enforcement proceedings during the same time period. This strange situation strongly
supports the inference that the agency’s lawyers are engaged in a frolic of their own in
the pending enforcement cases.
Third, a court could justify a refusal to defer to EPA’s 1999 interpretation of its
1980 rule based on an equitable extension of an administrative law doctrine that is rooted
in the due process clause. Courts regularly refuse to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous rules in the context of enforcement proceedings in which agencies seek to
impose penalties on firms for violating agency rules. A court will impose a penalty on a
firm for violating an ambiguous agency rule only if the court concludes that the agency
provided the firm with adequate notice that the firm’s conduct would violate the rule
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before the firm engaged in the conduct that is the basis for the agency’s attempt to impose
a penalty for violating the rule.180
Direct application of this constitutionally-based doctrine to the CAA enforcement
cases would have some beneficial effects. Since EPA fell far short of providing adequate
notice of its 1999 interpretation of its 1980 rule before the firms implemented the changes
to their facilities during the 1980-1999 period, EPA cannot rely on its 1999 interpretation
as the basis to penalize the firms for engaging in that pre-1999 conduct. That direct effect
of the adequate notice requirement would provide little real relief to the firms who are
defendants in those actions, however. If a court determines that a firm violated the rule,
and thus the statute, by making a change in its facility that constituted a “modification”
during the 1980-1999 period, the firm is required to install new pollution control
technology that costs up to one billion dollars per facility, or to abandon the facility, in
order to comply with the PSD provisions of CAA. I doubt that those costs qualify as a
penalty for purposes of invocation of the adequate notice requirement. 181
A court would have to be willing to extend the adequate warning requirement, or
something like it, to the context of costs of compliance with regulatory statutes, as well as
penalties, in order to relieve the defendants in these enforcement cases from having to
incur scores of billions of dollars of costs for engaging in conduct that they reasonably
believed to be free of all regulatory costs at the time they took those actions. Two recent
precedents – a 2003 opinion of the Sixth Circuit 182and a 2004 opinion of the First
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Circuit183 -- support just such an extension of the adequate notice requirement in
circumstances in which an agency has affirmatively misled regulates. Both opinions
involved attempts by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to rely on a new interpretation of
an agency rule in enforcement actions as the basis for its claim that regulatees were
required to make extremely expensive changes in their facilities.
In 1992, DOJ issued a rule to implement the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
rule required owners of movie theaters to provide seating for disabled individuals that
provide the individuals with “lines of sight comparable” to those enjoyed by non-disabled
people.184 DOJ proceeded to announce myriad inconsistent interpretations of that rule
over the following decade.185 Then, in 2000, DOJ initiated enforcement actions against
several firms that had built many hundreds of new theaters during the time the rule was in
effect.186 Each of the theaters complied with the rule, as it had been interpreted at the time
the theater was built, but none complied with the rule as DOJ interpreted it for the first
time in the enforcement proceedings. Both the Sixth Circuit and the First Circuit upheld
DOJ’s new interpretation of the ambiguous rule, but both also concluded that the
defendants did not have adequate notice of the interpretation to justify imposition of
penalties against them.187 Both courts then referred to the need for the district courts to
apply equitable principles in the enforcement actions on remand.188 In the words of the
First Circuit:
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Due process may furnish a floor [against having to make large expenditures]
based primarily on lack of fair warning, but we think that equitable principles give
the district court even greater latitude to decline or limit retroactivity. For
example, the court might equitably consider not only the level of warning but also
government indolence or misleading advice and the avoidance of extravagant
expenditure for little gain.189

The equitable considerations alluded to by the First Circuit apply a fortiori to the pending
CAA enforcement proceedings. The government should not be able to play gotcha with
regulatees by first announcing an interpretation of a rule in 1980 that encourages them to
make large capital investments in improvements to their facilities by assuring them that
they are not thereby subjecting themselves to massive regulatory costs, and then in 1999
announcing a new interpretation that requires them to choose between spending billions
of dollars on those facilities or closing them.
If EPA had announced its 1999 interpretation of modification in 1980, owners of
most old, coal-fired generating plants would have closed them rather than spending close
to a billion dollars on each to comply with PSD. Perhaps that would have been the better
policy decision in 1980 – though it would have increased our dependence on oil imported
from the middle east, increased the price of electricity significantly, and increased the
severity of the stagflation conditions that then plagued the economy. Perhaps that would
be the better policy decision today. EPA should be, and is, free to make that policy
decision at any time as long as it makes the decision for prospective application only.
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EPA should not be free, however, to make that policy decision in 1999 with retroactive
application to conduct that took place before 1999.

V. CONCLUSION

My analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dow and of the court decisions
issued in response to the Clinton Administration’s efforts to redefine modification for
CAA PSD purposes has uncovered what I believe to be two serious problems that are
attributable to our current administrative law doctrines. First, a newly elected President
often cannot get his policies announced in a form that courts will accept for many years
after he is elected. This produces such a large lag between the election of a President and
judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies that the policies the government is
implementing are at least one, and often two, Presidential elections behind. Second,
through judicial application of our present deference doctrines, it is quite possible to get a
situation in which regulatees are required to make extremely large regulatory
expenditures for having taken actions in the past that would be free of regulatory costs
today and that the government encouraged them to take at the time they took the actions.
The first problem is attributable in large measure to the Supreme Court’s refusal
to defer to an agency’s policy decision reflected in a statutory interpretation unless and
until the agency announces that decision in either a legislative rule or a decision issued in
a formal adjudication. To reduce the magnitude of the time lag problem, I urge the
Supreme Court to adopt Justice Scalia’s proposed broader approach to Chevron
deference. A court should confer Chevron deference on an agency’s reasonable
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interpretation of ambiguous language in an agency-administered statute whenever the
agency announces its interpretation in a manner that reflects the agency’s “fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question.”
The second problem is attributable in part to the willingness of court’s to defer to
agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules in enforcement proceedings even when
the interpretation urged in the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with both the
interpretation of the rule the agency announced before the conduct at issue took place and
with the agency’s current rules. I urge courts to respond to that problem by qualifying
deference doctrine in three ways that have some support in the case law – a court should
not defer to an agency interpretation of an agency rule that is open-ended and that merely
parrots the vague language of the statute it purports to implement; a court should not
defer to an agency interpretation of a rule when the interpretation is announced only as a
litigating position and when there is reason to believe that the interpretation does not
reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the issue;” and, a court should not
allow an agency to apply retroactively a new interpretation of an ambiguous rule when
the result would be to compel a regulatee to make large regulatory expenditures because
of conduct the agency encouraged the regulatee to take.

60

